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ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE ALL OR PORTIONS OF APPELLEE'S
RESPONSIVE BRIEF FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
This Court should strike all or portions of Appellee's responsive brief for failing to

comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
At this stage in the litigation the Appellee is representing himself Pro Se. Former
counsel, Don Bybee, is under an order of suspension from the practice of law. Although the
brief was delivered to counsel in an envelope with a return address from Mr. Bybee it
purports to be filed Pro Se by the appellee. Notwithstanding appellee's lay status Pro Se
litigants are presumed to know the rules and are held to the same standards as are licensed
attorneys. Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266,268,372 P.2d 990,991 (1962); Mankav.
Martin, 200 Colo. 260, 614 P.2d 875, 880 (1980) (en banc), cert. Denied, 450 U.S. 913
(1981); Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Wyo., 630 P. 2d 514,517, cert. Denied, 454
U.S. 1118 (1981), Smithy. Rabb, 95 Ariz49, 53, 386 P.2d 649, 652 (1963).
Rule 24(e) makes it mandatory for a party to provide citations to the record for those
factual legal matters which they advance and argue in their brief. The Supreme Court has
stated that it need not and will not consider any facts not properly cited to or supported by
the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). Further,
briefs which put forth legal argument which is not properly documented are also disregarded
by the court. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987). In the present
case, the Appellee makes a disingenuous and ambiguous general reference to the Trial
3

Transcript in his statement of facts. However, the facts put forth and the citations thereto
do not comport with the record.
The following are examples of factual inaccuracies or conclusory statements
contained in Appellee's Statement of Facts:
Fact 3:
Appellee stated: The parties were married June 14, 1985 and no children
were born of the marriage. The divorce was finally granted May 8, 1998 although
Defendant was locked out of the home before, initiated divorce proceedings but was
not able to proceed due to disabling depression.
Comment:
There is citation to or no support in the record for the conclusory
statement that Defendant had disabling depression or that he was locked out of the
home. This misstatement of fact is irrelevant to appeal, could be considered as
scandalous information and should be stricken as inaccurate, unsupported, and
irrelevant.
Fact 6:
Appellee stated: Delores was also employed at the Postal Service and
made wages equal to or great than Victor (TT117-121) She retired due to election at
the same time Victor did.
Comment: This fact accurately states that Delores was employed as a Postal Service
worker but inaccurately states that she earned wages which were equal to or greater
than those earned by Defendant. The citation to the record supplied in support
thereof does not contain any information concerning the amount of income earned by
Delores or how that compared with the income of Mr. Shade^Havateyer, the record
does reflect that in 1996 Mr. Shade earned $42,476.62 (TT. 107) and Delores earned
$40,261.77 (TT. 50). Appellee's statement of fact is inaccurate and tends to mislead
this Court and should be stricken as inaccurate and unsupported.
Fact 7:
Appellee stated: Delores admitted $977.00 per month retirement
(TT.135) and with her other investments the Court found she had $1,460.00 per
month income. With his paying off her debts of $4,902.46 her expenses were reduced
by $395.00 per month leaving her discretionary money.
Comment: Except for Delores retirement income of $977 the statements contained
in this representation of fact are simply not supported by citations to the record.
Fact 8:

Appellee stated: Victor admitted $1,672 civil service retirement and an
4

application for $100 s z clal security makes it necessary for him to find part: time
employment which he has not found in more than 15 months, (Findings #15) Not
available to 2000.
iomi:, ...
record.
Fact y.
willing

I Ms representation of facts is not nuppnrtol h\ mi) citation I ll, ,

Delores could work but refuses to do so but Victor is
..•»* i c o n i c (R 86-87")

Comment: The fact that Delores could work is unsupported by any citation to the
record. Appellee's citation to the record reflects a portion of his testimony about his
ability to work and efforts to find work. The references to Delores ability to work
should be stricken.
£act lb.
Appellee stated: Delores stated she let nt* >n^ iwo husbands off on
alimony but the next one was going to pay (R 171 15).
Comment:
:icrs only to statements of counsel, was objected to and is not
evidence before the 'I rail Court. Rather, 'this was an irrelevant and unsupported
statement made by counsel during the trial to attempt to cast Delores in a negative
light. It should be stricken as unsupported by citation to evidence in the record which
was received, by the Trial Court.
Fact 12:
. Appellee stated: Delores brought a home into the m a rriage worth
$115,000 at marriage and $140,000 at trial with $78,000 mortgage (TT 3-4) which
was awarded to her and he delivered a deed but she refuses to remove him from the
mortgage or a deed to his St. George property now worth less than then stipulated
$60,000.
Comment:
I lie citation to the record correctly reflects the stipulated value of
140,000 on Delores home at the time of trial and the balance of the mortgage of
78,000. The remaining of the statements are unsupported by citation to the record
and are improper and should be stricken.
Fact 13:
Appellee stated: Victor contributed $20,000 (equity from a prior
marriage) (for refinancing) to pay down the mortgage. Later he paid $ 1,000.00 to put
a down payment on the St. George property to fee title to lA acre so she could sell it
and keep the $14,000 and got $10,000 home improvement contract both awarded to
her. He also constructed a business building she got worth $10,000 (TT p43 1 20 TT
p 47 I , 8).
5

Comment: The statements that Victor contributed 20,000 to the refinance of
Delores home and 1,000 as a down payment on the St. George property are properly
cited to the record all other statements are not supported by any citation to the record.
The statement that she got a building worth $10,000 is directly contradictory of the
finding of the Court (see TT205) and is misleading. These factual statements should
be stricken.
Fact 14:
Appellee stated: The Court stated its determination not to rearrange the
unique history of accounting (TT 205-206) he further stated "I am not going to award
fees because I don't find him the ability to pay after I stick him with all of the debt"
(TT p207 LI & 2)
Comment:
stricken.

Appellee has failed to properly cite to the record. This fact should be

Fact 16:
Appellee stated: Victor had a business which showed no profit and in
fact cost $11,000 which business went to her son (TT 37) which was sold for $9,000
but which never got paid, in full.
Comment:

This fact is not properly cited to the record and should be stricken.

Fact 17:
Appellee stated: Delores said Victor offered in negotiations to pay
$35,000 which she refused and the Court did not admit that in evidence and she never
saw the money, and he did not have it.
Comment:

This fact is not properly cited to the record and should be stricken.

In short, Appellee's brief does fall far short of the requkemeqj^ofj&le 24(e) and as
such the entire brief or at least the non complying portions should be stricken
H.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD DELORES HER
PREMARITAL EQUITY IN THE REAL PROPERTY TOGETHER WITH
THE APPRECIATION THEREOF.
The trial court committed reversible error in failing to award Delores her

premarital equity in the real property together with the appreciation thereof. The trial court
misapplied the law resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly

6

preponderates against thefindings,and a serious inequity has resulted such as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion.
It is the rule of law in this state that premarital property, together with the appreciation
thereof, should normally be awarded to the party who brought that property into the
marriage. Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133,135 (Utah 1987). While there are exceptions, such
as where one of the spouses has contributed to the assets maintenance or enhancement of
value, none of the exceptions to the above stated rule apply in this case.
The Court's ruling was not in accordance with the clear weight of the evidence which
was before it and therefore a substantial and prejudicial error occurred. The Court
misapphed foe tew by completely disiegaidfog \>etares>'s premarital interest in foe
Taylorsville house and made no effort to return this to her with the appreciation thereof
before dividing the portion of the equity which was a part of the marital estate. The fact that
she had premarital equity was uncontroverted. The Trial Court did was award her the
residence together with the increased debt thereon (which had been incurred to purchase the
St. George property) and awarded to Victor the St. George property free and clear of any
encumbrance. The net result was that he received all of the equity built up during the
marriage and she received none. The ruling is so obviously inequitable that it manifests a
clear abuse of discretion. As such, the trial court committed reversMe error and mis Court
should reverse and remand with instructions on how to divide the marital and pre-marital
equity.

7

III.

THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT A FORMULA APPROACH TO THE
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PRE-MARITAL AND ASSETS.

In cases where issues of pre-marital equity and marital equity exist, this Court should
adopt a formula approach to the equitable distribution of marital and pre-marital assets.
Judge Michael D. Lyon of the Second Judicial District Court wrote an article in the Utah Bar
Journal, entitled "The Source of Funds Rule-Equitably Classifying Separate and Marital
Property" which sets forth a formula approach to the division of both marital and nonmarital
assets based on the treatise by Brett R. Turner, entitled "Equitable Distribution of Property."
Judge Lyon's article sets forth an easily followed explanation of this theory. A copy of the
article is attached in the appendix to this brief. Delores urges this Court to adopt the formula
set forth in the Source of Funds Rule as a method of standardizing the equitable distribution
of separate and mixed property in this state. Doing so will provide a greater degree of
certainty for domestic practitioners and the bench and more uniformly and equitably
administer justice in domestic cases in this State.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE ADEQUATE
FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY AND BY DENYING
DELORES AN AWARD OF ALIMONY.

The trial court erred by failing to make any findings on the issue of alimony. As such,
this Court must remand this action for further findings. While the Court must consider the
three factors of: 1) need, 2) ability of the recipient spouse to meet that need, and 3) ability
of payor spouse to assist, the failure to make specific findings on these issues is reversible
8

error.
The trial court failed to make findings on all of the material issues. Specifically, the
finding as set forth above only genetically addresses the issues of need. It fails to find the
reasonable expenses of Delores to establish a level of need. The Court also failed to make
anyfindingas to Delores's ability to meet her level of need. Finally, and without any finding
of supporting facts, the Court summarily concluded that Victor did not have the ability to
pay. The record in this matter is replete with controverted evidence concerning Victor's
reasonable expenses and his income which are both relevant to the issue of alimony. (TT.
19; 63-77 ). The Court simply failed to make any finding as to what his income and expense
was. The facts in the record are capable of supporting a finding in favor of an award of
alimony. As such, the Court's findings are inadequate and constitute an abuse of discretion.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD DELORES
ATTORNEY FEES IN THIS ACTION.

For the same reasons set forth in Argument Section IV above, the trial court erred in
failing to award Delores her attorney fees in this action. The evidence in the record is
capable of demonstrating a need by Delores for fees, and the ability of Victor to pay them.
However, when the Court made its ruling it failed to make any finding of fact and regarding
fees and as such the ruling is inadequately supported and constitutes reversible error.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIVIDE THE PARTIES
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS.

The trial court erred in failing to divide the parties retirement accounts. It is axiomatic
9

that retirement accounts are marital property and that Civil Service retirement accounts are
subject to division in a divorce proceeding. Jefferies v. Jefferies. 895 P.2d 835, 837-38
(Utah App. 1995). Not only is it proper for the trial court to consider such assets, "it is
required." Id
In the present case the Court failed to divide the difference between Victor and
Delores retirement accounts based on contributions made during the marriage or to make
sufficient alternative distributions. The Court failed to make any form of finding or
allocation for what portion of the retirement was earned during the marriage and what
amount was a marital asset subject to division. The Court failed to make alternative
compensatory awards to either equalize the parties incomes by way of an alimony award or
to provide Delores with sufficient assets to offset the disparity in income. This is reversible
error.
CONCLUSION
The Appellee's brief fails to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and should
be stricken. The trial court committed reversible error in failing to award Delores her
premarital equity in the real property together with the appreciation thereof. This Court
should adopt a formula approach to the equitable distribution of mixed marital/pre-marital
assets. The trial court erred by failing to make adequate findings on the issue of alimony.
The trial court erred in failing to award Delores her attorney fees in this action. The trial
court erred in failing to divide the parties retirement accounts. Based on the foregoing, this
Court must remand for additional findings and should reverse on the issues of alimony and
10

the division of the premarital real property and the appreciation thereof.
RESPECTFULLY submitted t h i s ^ S a y of March, 1999.
STEVEN-OTYCKSEN
Steven C. Tycksen
Attorney for Appellant
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The Source ofFunds Rule - Equitably Classifying
Separate and Marital Property
byJudge Michael D, Lyon

jMLost district court judges andfamilylaw lawyers have handled a case similar to the following example: Wife has a house
with a mortgage when the partes are married; die title stays in
her name and the parties pay on the mortgage widi marital
funds. How, then, at the time of the divorce is the equity or value
in die house divided? More specifically, how is Wife's separate
interest protected while assuring that the marital contribution to
the value of the home is respected? The salient objective of this
article is to share with the bar and bench the source of funds
role, a tod which provides an equitable and systematic method
of classifying separate and marital property.'
1. UTAH LAW ON THE OASSmOIION OF PROPERTY
Thcanaiv^ofapropeilydivisKmiiKidenttoad^orcebegins
with section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, which ostensibly givesa
trial court broad power to equitably divide all property owned
by the parties,regardlessof when or bow it was acquired:
"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include
m it equitable orders relating to die children, property, debts or
obligations, and parties," U.CA § 30-3-5 (1997). Indeed,
facially it creaies an ailproperty ^ e m ; namely, thai aB property owned by the parties may be equitably apportioned
between them, regardless of ownership or whenever acquired.
Historically, the Utah Supreme Coun was reluctant to go beyond
the broad language of the statute and provide hard and fast
rulesforproperty division, holding instead that a grant of broad
discretion to die trial court would better ensure an equitable
result. Consequently, the Utah high courtfoundno abuse of
discretion when premarital property; or separate gifts and
inheritance, were liberally divided between die divorcing pzrUes.SeeNeumteyerv.flewmeyert7A5?MW
BusbeUiBusheU, 649P.2d85 (Utah 1982);Zfefto&*.
Dubois. 504 R2d 1380 (1973). U m t e ; it affirmed trial
courts on the odier end of the spectrum who concluded that
each party should, in general, receive the real and personal

property he or she brought into die marriage. See Preston v
Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedesv. Georgettes,
627 P.2d 44 (Utah lW)Jesperson v.Jesperson, 610 R2d 326
(Utah 1980); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 R2d 193 (Utah
1974).
In the past decade our appellate courts have recognized die
value of adopting and consistently applying some general rules
and have created an analyticalframeworkforthe treatment and
division of separate and marital property In Mortensenv.
Mortensenr 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), Justice Howe articulated
what has become the general rule in the division of separate or
inherited property.
[Tjrial courts making ''equitable" property division
pursuant to section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with
die rule prevailing in most odier jurisdictions and with
die division made in many of our own cases, generally
award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the mamage (or property acquired in
exchange thereof) to thai spouse, together with any
appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) die
Judge Michael D. Lyon was appointed to
tbe Second District Court inJuly 1992 by
Governor Norman H Bangerter He
serves as chair of the BoardofDistrict
Judges and he recentfy sewed as presidingjudge of the Second District Court.
He is a member and past president of
RexE. LeeAmerican Inn of Court Prior
to bis Judicial appointment, be practiced in general litigation
with the lawfirm oflyon, Heigesen, WaterfallsJones in
Ogden, Utah. Judge Lyon received bis KS. degree, cum hude,
from Weber State College and bis JJX degree from the University of Utah College of Law in 1971. His is married and the
father of six children.

ItthJ 0 I I H I A I

other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection
of that property; thereby acquiring an equitable interest to
ft, or (2> the property has been consumed or its identity
lost through commingling or exchanges or where the
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest thereinto
the other spouse.
UL at 308 (citations omitted).

2. THE SOURCE Of FUNDS RULE
A. Importance of Bqritob^
This current emphasis on property classification highlights a
hole in Utah case law. Although Utah law is nowfairlydear as to
die analysis a trial court and litigants mustfollowonce property
has been classified, there have not been any Utah cases that
have clearly defined bow to determine if an asset is marital or
separate property. The source of funds rale therefore fits
cleanly and logically into the backdrop of existing Utah law
because it is purely a rule of classification thai provides a definiuon of marital property. Indeed, as discussed in more detail
below, although Utah has notformallyadopted the source of
funds as a method of classification, many Utah cases apply
source of funds principles. I recommend to the reader Brett R
Turners treatise, Equitable Distribution of Property, from
which came many of the ideas and formulas used in this article.

Mortensen is a seminal decision because it not only provides a
more definite statement upon which practitioners and trial
courts can rely; it shifts the analysis in Utah from an all property
system to a modified dualclassification system, where prop*
erty is first categorized as either separate or marital and then,
presumptive^ the separate property is grven to die owner
spouse and the marital property is divided equitably. Tbe~presumptkm that separate property is given to the owner spouse
Classification of property as either separate or marital must
may be rebutted, however, if there are just and equitable reafocus on when and how die property was acquired* The theory
sons to do otherwise. Thus, the dual classification system that is
of the source of funds rule begins with the premise that propabsolute in some states is a modified system in Utah because
erty is acquired by the parties when its
equity might require the trial court to
"Classification of property as real economic value is created For
invade separate property in fashioning
either separate or marital must example, a party may hold legal tide to a
an equitable result
house upon purchase, but will actually
focus on when and how the
Since Mortensen, apparently in the
only "acquire" equity in the property as
property was acquired."
interest of promoting more predictabilthe mortgage is reduced or paid cS.
ity and encouraging more consistent results, the Utah Court of
Thus, in the opening example, although Wife holds tidetothe
Appeals has restricted a trial court* ability to divide separate
house upon marriage, if the actual value of the home is create
property between the parties to a m a t o l
during the marriage through marital mortgage payments, the
naiycircumstancesr B t t ^ R i t e t 799R2d H66 (UtahApp,
source of funds rule would define the home as marital property
lW^CK^niniqiiecira^
because its value was acquired during the marriage.
64 (Utah App. 1991). The court of appeals has been more
The above example also ilhSniestH%e acquisition of an
proactive in monitoring the trial court's divisions, emphasizing
asset may be a continuing process of making payments for die
that property division should be done In a "fair; systematic
acquired property and, at the time of die divorce, there may be
bshton. n HaRa Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). Specifiboth a separate and a marital component in the value of the
cally, the court of appeals requires detailedfindingsas to die
property. (This example is not to be confused with a situation
classification of property before it is (imd&LSeeHauTTtontv
where a separate asset has been commingled widi marital assets
Haumonttm?2dm
(UtahApp. 1990) (remandedfor
or has been pfied to the marital estate such that die asset has
findings as to the source of the disputed properties); Rappkye
lost its separate classification. When a separate asset is comv.Rappkye, 855 R2d260 (UtahApp. 1993) (similarresult);
raingjed, it should be classified as marital property and divided
Burt v. Burt, 799 R2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) (similar result).
between the parties. Mortensen, 760 R2d at 308.) Consider
Thus, it is critical for trial cows and lawyers representing
these further detailstothe above example: Wife owns a house
divorcing litigants to be conversant with a consistent approach
with a fair market value of $ 100,000 at the time of the marriage
for classifying and dividing separate property.
and at that time the house carries an $80,000 mortgage. The
house remains in her separate name and the parties use marital
funds to pay down die mortgage. At the time of die divorce, the

(stir market value is still $100,000 but the mortgage is now
$60,000. Atrial court using the source of foods approach
would classify (20,000 of the $40,000 of acquired value In the
home as separate property and the remaining $20,000 as marital property

should be adopted, and yet litigants routinely bypass a more
complicated analysis by simply backing out the separate interest giving ittothe owner spouse, and then dividing the
remaining property equally.
Hie facts and outcome of Hall v. Mail 858 E2d 1018 (Utah
App. 1993), Illustrate the inequities of this routine approach. In
Hall, the trial court found that the wife had contributed $21,000
into a marital home, and so it dMded the equity in die home
equally and then took $21,000 out of the husband's marital
share and gave ittothe wife. The court of appeals held that, in
orderforan allocation of property to be done in a afair,systematic fehion," die trial court shouldfirstclassify proper^ »
separate or marital, then award the wife her separate contribution (absent "extraordinary circumstances"), and then divide
the marital equity in die home equally between the parties.

Obviously, a practitioner or a trial judge will rarely be bced
with dividing property that has not either appreciated or depredated in value. Typically; the trial judge and the litigants are
faced wtth the difficult proposition of classifying appreciation
caused by forces outside the parties' control, such as inflation
or market forces. I have found in several cases I have decided,
that it is in these situations bat the source of funds rule and
accompanying formulas are most hdpfaL The source of funds
rule dictates that this kind of appreciation be given the same
character as the underlying asset Accordingly, if the asset has
been acquired by separate funds, all of the appreciation is .
Following these instructions, if the trial courtfoundno extraorseparate, likewise, if the asset has beat acquired with separate
dinary circumstances on remand, the ^
ami marital fonds, wiuch is the typical situation, the apprecia$21,000 was returned to her without a proportionate share of
tion is allocated between the marital
"When a Separate
interest
in
the Intend Her $21,000 investment in
and separate estates proportionally.
the home was therefore treated as an
Brett R. Tinner, Equitable Distribution
property is simpfy returned at interest-fret loan to the marriage. Mr
of Property 163 (2d ed. 1994). Giving
the end ofa marriage without Ibrner, in commenting on the Hail case,
appreciation the same classification as
any attributable interest, the points out that had the value of the
the asset that produced die appreciation
property has inequitably been home dropped, it would clearly have
is supported by a line of Utah cases. See
used as an interest-free loan." been improperfordie court to reimMortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 (holding
burse petitionerforher separate
that separate property should be awarded to the owner spouse
contributions, leading die marital estatetobear die entire loss.
'together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value");
M
If die separate estate must share the loss, however, it is only
Dunn u Dunn, 802 R2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990) (affirming
fair to allow It to share the gain. When marital and separate
award to plaintiff of retirement benefits accumulated prior to
contributions are made to a single asset, the respective marital
marriage, together with ail interest attributable to those premarand separate interests should be treated as percentages and not
ital contributions);/Vssftm a Preston, 646P.2d705 (Utah
as absolute amounts." Tomer, supra, S388Tapp. A.
1982) (remanding to the trial courtforan award to defendant
1 believe that given the court of appeals' preferencefora sysof separate property together with the proportion of appreciatematic, fair approach, had the wife objected to die trial court's
tion in value attributable thereto).
failure to provide more dian mere reimbursement of die sepaAlthough allocating appreciation proportionally may force
rate invesunent, the court of appeals would have approved
members of the bar and benchfromtheir comfort zones to
awarding die wife a proportionate dare of the interest. Howperform mathematical exercises, 1 believefailuretoaward a
ever; since die parties did not raise the amount of
litigant who has separate funds in an asset a proportionate
reimbursement on appeal, die court of appeals appropriately
share of die appreciation of the asset is not only inequitable, but
did not address the issue. Clearly, then,toensure thau spouse's
constitutes plain crrot When a separate interest In property Is
separate property isfollyand equitably restored wifli a proporamply returned at the end of a marriage without any attributuonate share of die interest, it is essentialforpractitioners and
able interest, Ae property has inequitaWy been used as an
trial court judges to understand and conastendy apply die
interest-free loan. Absent compelling equitable reasons to the
sometimes difficult source offends formulas.2
contra* no one could argue persuasively that this approach
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*. The Source of Funds Formula*
As stated above, when a property's appreciation Is caused by
forces outside the parties' control, such as inflation or market
forces, the appreciation should be given the same classification
as the underlying property. If, therefore, the parties have con*
tributed to the property $10,000 in separate funds and $20,000
in marital funds, the appreciation should be classified proportionally or one-third as separate and two-thirds as maritaLIn
Mr. Tamer's mathematical formulas, this translates as follows:
Kt&e (or net equity) « separate contributions + marital
contributions + appreciation
Marital interest = value(marital contributions/total
contributions)
Separate interest = value(separate contributionsAotal
contributions)
Application of the formula is clearer through use of our example, with additional details: M e owns a house with a fair
market value of $100,000 at the time of die marriage and at the
time of the marriage the house carries an $80r000 mortgage.
The house remains in her separate name and die parties use
marital funds to pay down the mortgage. At the time of die
divorce, the fair market value has increased to $160,000, due to
market forces, and the mortgage is now $40,000. The numbers
would plug into the formulas as follows:
Value (or net equity) « separate contributions + marital
contributions + appreciation
separate contributions = FMV at marriage -mortgage
at marriage
* $100,000 - $80f000 « $20,000
marital contributions = Mortgage at marriagemortgage at divorce
= $80,000- $40,000 m $40,000
Value * $20,000 + $40,000 + $60,000 = $120,000 in
net equity
separate interest » value(sep, contribution/total
contribution)
separate interest = $120,000 ($20,0O0/$60,0OO)
= $40,000
marital interest = vaiue(mar. contribution/total
contribution)
marital interest = $120,000($40,00(V$601000)
» $80,000
Therefore, under the source of funds rule, die $120,000 of
equity is classified $40,000 as Wt's separate interest and
$80,000 as marital interest Wife would therefore I* entitled,

absent extraordinary circumstances, to $80,000 inequity
($40,000 separate interest plus one-half of the marital interest)She receives bade her separate contribution of $20,000 plus the
portion of appreciation that is attributable thereto; she receives
a return on her investment Typically, if the court determinesa
division of properly should be consistent with this classification,
the home is either sold or awarded to die owner spouse, who
also assumes responsibility for die mortgage payments and
must pay her former spouse his equity. In our example, Wife
would receive the home, worth $160,000, assume payments on
the $40,000 mortgage, and be forced to buyout Husband's
$40,000 of equity. Thus, even though die is awarded the home,
she receives no more than her share of the equity.
The above example assumes all of the appreciation on the home
is a result of market forces or inflation. When, however, appreciation results from specific contributions of marital funds or
efforts, die resulting appreciation assumes the character of the
funds or efforts. Twxzsupra, at 162. This classification of
appreciation from capital improvements is m accordance with
Utah case law thar when a spouse has by his or her efforts and
expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection of the property, he or she has acquired an equitable
interest in it Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308.
To illustrate how a court could classify appreciation flat maybe
in part due to capital improvements, assume thisfinalvariation
of my example; W e owns a house widi afairmarket value of
$100,000 and an $80,000 mortgage at the toe of the marriage.
The house remains in her separate name, and the parties pay
down the mortgage using marital funds and, using $20,000 of
marital funds, finish off die basement At the tune of the divorce,
thefiurmarket value of theljpuselHSJpcreased to $160,000
and 4 e mortgage is $40,000.1 believe that the most equitable
approach is to add the value of the marital funds expended on
the home, or $20,000, to the amount of marital contributions
and the amount of total contributions, as shown below:
Value (or net equity) • separate contributions + marital
contributions + appreciation
separate contributions - FMV at marriage-mortgage
at marriage
= $100,000 - $80,000 = $20,000
marital contributions » [Mortgage at marriage- mortgage at divorce] + marital foods
spent on capital improvements
= ($80,000 - $40,0001 + $20,000
= $60,000

Value = $20,000 + $60,000 + $40,000 = $120,000 in
net equity
separate interest » value(sep. contribution/total
contribution)
separate interest* $120,000 ($20,00(y$80,000)
= $30,000
marital interest» value(mar. contribution/total
contribution)
marital interest * $120,000($60,00(V$801000)
= $90,000
Therefore Wife would be entitled (absent extraordinary equitable circumstances) to $30,000 as a separate interest in the
home and the $90,000 marital interest would be divided equaBy
betweendie parties.5 It should be noted that there may be times
when evidence is presented astothe amount of appreciation
directly resultingfromthe improvement When a trial court is
presented widi this kind of evidence, it seems equitable that the
appreciation resulting directlyfromthe capital improvement be
backed out of the total appreciation and classified as maritaL
The remaining appreciation should then be apportioned
between the separate and marital contributions using the formulas and, because the appreciation duetothe capital
improvement has already been allocated, the marital funds
spent on die capital improvement should not be included in
cither the numerator (marital contributions) or the denominator (total contributions) of the working fractions.
C. Evidence
As is illustrated by Hall, appellate courts cannot rule on die
appropriateness of allocating appreciation proportionally
dirough d » source of funds rule without detailedfindingsfrom
die trial court judge. Similarly a trial court cannot properly
apply die source of hindsformulasif die litigants do not present
detailed evidence as to the value of the property. To ensure
Udgants do provide die necessary data, 1 use a pretrial ordet;
specifically advising die parties dot die allocation of separate
property seems to be at issue, and that the parties should be
prepared to present evidence as to the following:
1. The home'sfairmarket value and mortgage amount at die
time of die trial;
2. The amount of die parties' marital contribution to the
equity (or die amount the partes have paid on die mortgage during the marriage and, separately, any capital
contributions); and

3.Tteamoumofthepreinaritalequ^intei^indiehome/
3. CONCLUSION
DavkiS.DolowiU,mtheAp^
Journal, criticizes the appellate courtsfoe;among other things,
being inconsistent and sometime inequitable in their treatment
of appreciation on separate property. David S. Dolowitz, The
Conundrum of Gifted, Inherited and Premarital Property in
Divorce, 11 Utahfi.J. 3 at 16(1998)* His comments may well
Indicate the growing level offrustrationamong members of the
bar who arc left widwut definite, equitable guidance in this area.
I have found the source of funds ruletobe practical in its direction astothe classification of separate and marital
equftabk in its result
tyfooistagdw^
value of die property and when that property was acquired and
by providingformulastintmay be consistentiy applied, its
adoption would help dimmate some of die apparent frustration
among members of die bench and bar by providing dear direction, therebyfosteringmore negotiated settlements and
ensuring more uniform, equitable trial court decisions. Membets of die bench and bar should move beyond occasional
application of source of funds principles to wholesale adoption
ofthesotirceoffundsruk.Mr.lli^
distribution decisions defining the time at which property is
acquiredfallinto two classes: those which adopt the source of
funds rule, and tfwse which avoid the issue." Thrner, supra, a
354, app. A.

lfankiJadseyKGuaaf^tJi«cfcrkfo
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I'Tropecy* is aordrtacd in to i ^ C&^
taduAa «fl property either owned by ote jpouse prior to mafifegc.arreceftedbyt
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oMnbwwt re yeinyippitciiMOfi accord
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(Sapp. 1997).
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